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Abstract 
This study investigates the prices of tied foreign aid imports by estimating the price 
differentials between tied aid imports and non-aid imports from bilateral sources to Ghana. 
The study finds a significant mark-up on the prices of tied aid imports relative to non-aid 
imports, which translates into substantial cost to Ghana. Several reasons, both in Ghana 
and in the donor countries, could be found for the estimated price differentials. Ghana 
needs to take steps to improve its investment climate, as a way of reducing investment 
risk, which in turn will enhance the confidence of export financiers to reduce the incentive 
to mark up prices of tied commodities. On the part of donor countries, there may be need 
to examine the market for the supply of aided commodities towards the liberalization of 
such markets. It is suggested that although the higher costs on tied imports may be a 
necessary price Ghana had to pay to obtain aid, the associated cost provides a case for 
the cancellation of the bilateral aid debt of Ghana. 
1. Introduction 
he ever-widening gap between the developed and developing countries has become 
central issue of our time. The effort to reduce it has over the past four decades 
t reduced, among other things, a transfer of financial resources on an unprecedented 
scale from the "richer" to the "poorer" countries.1 The fundamental idea of foreign aid 
was that resources would be transferred to developing countries on concessional terms, 
that is, on terms and conditions more generous than those on credits obtainable from the 
world's capital markets. The idea of concessionality is to enable aid patterns to be 
compatible not just with the aims of growth but with a position of net indebtedness that 
is tolerable in the long term in the recipient countries. 
Be that as it may, international aid for development is today fraught with disillusion 
and distrust. This is because both donors and recipients alike have been exposed to 
unending problems. The issue of the quality of aid and its effectiveness in promoting 
development is at the centre of the debate.2 This issue has gained wider attention in 
recent years for many reasons, including the growing indebtedness of developing countries. 
In sub-Saharan Africa, rising external debt now represents one of the greatest economic 
problems. In Ghana, for example, external debt service requirements are now a major 
constraint to both domestic fiscal stability and rapid income growth (see Osei, 1995). 
Much of the "debt overhang" and the wider issue of the influence of aid on the pace and depth of development depend on how the aid is used in the recipient country. 
For example, if aid finances productive investments with higher rates of domestic and 
external returns than the cost of borrowing, the debt service requirements should normally 
be met from the increased future stream of foreign exchange earnings and still leave net 
benefit for the recipient economy. In many developing countries, however, especially in 
Africa, where aid finances investments with long gestation periods and/or large 
indivisibilities with low returns, especially in the early years, the concessionality of aid 
is crucial to the effectiveness of the assistance in promoting development. 
The practice of aid tying by which donors impose restrictions on where the recipient 
can spend aid funds, and/or end-use restrictions - through the specification of commodities 
and projects for which external assistance can be used - has long raised concerns about 
the quality and the effectiveness of aid. These restrictions reduce the degree of competition 
in the supply of foreign aid goods and services. As the theory of price traditionally dictates, 
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the smaller the number of competitors, the lower the probability of lower prices and a 
more efficient allocation of resources. This theory is borne out by a considerable number 
of empirical studies on market performance, which indicate that monopoly control of 
markets lead to higher prices. 
In effect, restrictions imposed by tying could represent an abuse of market power to 
extract excessive profit through the higher prices on tied goods and services. For sub-
Saharan African countries, already facing external debt problems and the need to make 
optimal use of limited financial resources, such an abuse of market power by aid donors, 
which leads to higher prices on tied aid goods and services, could worsen the debt problems 
and accentuate the aid dependency situation of the region. 
It is important to be clear about what is being said here. From both development 
quality and aid effectiveness perspectives, it is not that tied aid is "bad" and untied aid is 
"good". What ultimately matters is the degree of competition in the procurement process: 
tied aid contracts won through a competitive process are likely to meet aid quality 
objectives, while formally untied aid offers that are de facto tied will not. Thus, it is to 
the extent that tied aid is characterized by a lack of competition in the procurement 
process that it may impose additional cost on recipient countries and reduce the 
effectiveness of international assistance. 
Thus, the aid-tying practices by donors require careful scrutiny for their possible 
costs to recipient countries. However, although there is considerable empirical literature 
on market performance dealing with the selling prices in domestic markets of the major 
aid donor countries, these analyses have not been extended to a systematic investigation 
of prices offered for foreign aid goods and services. At the same time, as Morrissey and 
White (1996:208) observe, "there are a priori reasons to believe that procurement prices 
under tied aid will be somewhat higher than prices under fully untied aid". This study on 
Ghana is intended as an effort in the direction of investigating the prices of tied imports. 
Purpose of this study 
The purpose of the study is to investigate whether bilateral donors to Ghana charge higher prices for aid imports tied to their own source(s). The main objective of the 
study is to provide the empirical evidence that may be useful in formulating the policy 
responses to aid tying in the effort to make external aid to Ghana more effective. 
The study is divided into four sections. The next section provides background 
information: in this section we examine the magnitudes, composition and sources of 
external aid to Ghana. The section also discusses the tying practices of some of the 
major bilateral donors to Ghana. Section three attempts to estimate the cost of aid tying 
through an analysis of import prices. The last section is the conclusion. 
2. The profile of aid to Ghana: 
Magnitude, sources and composition 
the start of Ghana's Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in 1983, a chronic 
lortage of foreign exchange was a major constraint to the economic recovery. 
oor export performance had translated into a large current account deficit on 
the balance of payment. Imports of essential inputs for the economic recovery were, 
therefore, severely curtailed. At the same time, since the achievement of a viable balance 
of payments depended on the ability to import intermediate and capital goods to restructure 
industry and build new capacity, the economy was in a vicious circle: it could not achieve 
balance of payments viability because of inability to import, and it could not import 
because of balance of payment constraints. Over the last decade in spite of some 
improvement in export performance, the current account deficit on the balance of payments 
has continued to widen.3 Consequently, the availability of external assistance on 
concessional terms has since 1983 been critical for the success of the economic recovery 
programme, (see, for example, World Bank, 1984, 1989, 1992). 
Since the inception of the ERP the external aid map of the country has seen dramatic 
transformation. Not only has the magnitude of aid in support of the reforms grown, its 
composition and origin have also shown greater diversity. At the initial stages of the 
programme (1983-1986), total aid inflows averaged about $200 million a year. This 
level of inflows represented about 4% of GDP (see Table 1). The level of inflows then 
rose rapidly to reach about $700 million in 1989 <11% of GDP). The level of inflows rose 
further to about $900 million (13% of GDP) in 1991. Since then, the average level of 
annual inflows has remained around $700 million (about 10% of GDP). Indeed, the level 
of inflows to Ghana since the inception of the ERP has been unprecedented in the country' s 
history.4 
The importance aid has assumed in Ghana since 1983 is reflected in its relationships 
in the government's budget. It is apparent from Table 1 that aid inflows have represented 
an ever-increasing level of the country's imports since 1983. The proportion of aid in 
total imports more than doubled from 16% in 1983 to 44% in 1989. Since then, this 
proportion has remained around 30%. Also, over the last decade external aid going into 
key sectors of the economy has expanded faster than government expenditures to these 
sectors. Since 1985, for example, external aid has represented an ever-increasing share of 
government expenditure going into the social and economic sectors of the Ghanaian 
economy. The ratio of aid to government expenditure in the social sector increased from 
about 4% in 1984 to 7% in 1988 and increased further to over 20% by 1995. 
4 RESEARCH PAPER 1 4 4 
Table 1: Total disbursed aid to Ghana, 1983-1995 
19831984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Total aid ($ million) 114 219 201 355 417 563 714 730 996 745 754 632 509 
Analyses: 
Aid as % of GDP 3 4 4 5 6 9 11 11 13 11 11 10 9 
Aid as % of imports 16 36 32 37 37 39 44 39 38 36 33 30 23 
Aid as % of current account 50 101 125 176 198 193 187 165 132 155 135 239 127 
Social sector aid/ 
Govt expend, in social sector(%) - 4 4 11 12 7 10 14 37 23 21 23 20 
Economic sector aid1 
Govt expend, in econ. sector (%) - 37 68 106 112 35 24 19 65 67 55 68 52 
Sources: Bank of Ghana, external aid department. 
Bank of Ghana, quarterly digest of statistics, various issues. 
Ministry of finance and economic planning, external aid section. 
World Bank (1984), Ghana: Policies and programme for adjustment. 
World Bank (1991), Ghana: Progress on adjustment. 
Similarly, the ratio of aid to government expenditure in the economic sector increased 
from about 30% to over 50% between 1984 and 1995. These rising ratios have come 
about as a result of the slow growth and/or proportional decline in government expenditure 
to these sectors. This situation suggests that external aid is now substituting for productive 
state expenditures in Ghana. The situation also reflects the aid dependency situation of 
the Ghanaian economy. As the country's dependence on foreign aid has thus increased, 
concern is now rife about the sustainability of the reforms, since Ghana cannot expect 
the higher levels of inflows to continue in future. This concern, while emphasizing the 
need for making optimal use of available aid resources, also brings to the fore the issue 
of aid tying, which may impose additional cost on the country, reduce the effectiveness 
of aid and accentuate the aid-dependency situation. 
The types of assistance the country has received since 1983 highlight the potential for 
aid tying in Ghana. At the early stages of the reforms (1983-1986), the bulk of aid was 
programme aid/balance of payments support, forming over 50% of the total inflows (see 
Table 2). Programme aid and balance of payments support suited Ghana's needs for 
relatively fast-disbursing assistance designed to relieve specific infrastructure and 
production bottlenecks. During this period multilateral institutions including the World 
Bank and the,UN dominated aid provision (see Table 3). Some of the assistance from 
these sources was tied. For example, the programme aid from the main multilateral donor, 
the International Development Association (IDA), was co-financed by several donors 
some of whom tied their assistance. Other donors also channelled their programme support 
through foreign exchange auctions in which successful bids were "earmarked" against 
imports from the donor source(s). 
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Table 2: Foreign aid to Ghana by type, 1983-1995 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Total aid ($ million) 114 219 201 355 417 563 714 730 996 745 754 632 509 
of which (%): 
Investment project aid 19.0 30.0 41.3 29.7 32.1 45.0 38.0 40.5 56.8 54.5 56.4 53.2 50.1 
Programme/Balance of 
payments support 52.0 48.0 48.2 51.6 46.4 34.7 43.6 37.5 28.5 26.8 14.6 18.1 20.6 
Free standing technical asst. 10.2 10.1 10.4 14.6 16.4 15.6 12.5 13.6 11.4 17.0 19.4 20.3 18.3 
Food aid - 4.2 5.1 4.1 5.1 4.7 5.9 8.4 3.3 1.7 1.4 1.1 1.6 
Emergency relief assistance - - - - - - 0.2 0.1 - - - -
Note: (1) Includes Investment-related technical assistance. 
(2) Includes credit lines to the private sector. 
Sources: Same as Table 1. 
Aid tying in Ghana has been more prevalent with investment project assistance (IPA). 
This type of aid formed about 30% of total inflows during the early stages of the reforms 
(see Table 2), but since 1988 has been a higher component of IPA. The share of this type 
of aid in total inflows has risen to about 50%. The increased share of investment project 
assistance has come about as the share of aid from bilateral sources has increased (see 
Table 3). Aid from bilateral donors has constituted about 50% of the total since 1988. 
The major bilateral donors include Japan, the United Kingdom, USA, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Canada and France. These bilateral donors attribute their increasing share 
in total aid to their desire to be more visible, a development that they relate to "a search 
for greater influence" in the country. They point out that while they had earlier opted to 
support the economic reforms with facilities channelled through multilateral agencies, it 
had lately became important for them to pursue specific project initiatives that yield 
direct observable impacts (Aryeetey, 1995). 
The desire of the major bilateral donors to be more visible with their aid programmes 
derives in part from commercial pressures on aid, which the OECD (1994) observes, 
have been growing in many of these countries in recent years.5 In response to such 
commercial pressures and also for other reasons, all the major bilateral donors tie their 
assistance in one form or the other.6 The United States, for example, uses formal tying 
restrictions under which it requires recipients to formally and contractually spend aid 
funds on imports of goods and services only from its own source(s). In order to ensure 
that these restrictions are not violated, aid is usually disbursed in such a way as to give 
rise to directly identifiable imports that can be related to a particular source or origin. 
When aid expenditure is not related to direct identifiable imports, as for example, in the 
case of the "local cost" component of project aid or "budgetary grants", formal restrictions 
are also devised in the form of "restricted accounts", under which the recipient is required 
to spend the aid on specified sources. In addition, there is the requirement that at least 
50% of the goods purchased must be transported in US ships, except in cases where this 
is impossible because of lack of services under the US flag. 
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Table 3: Foreign aid to Ghana by source, 1983-1995 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 19901991 1992 1993 1994 
Total aid ($ million) 114 219 201 355 417 563 714 730 996 745 754 632 
of which (%): 
Multilateral 46 56 53 66 69 58 45 58 45 40 51 32 
Bilateral 53 43 46 34 30 41 55 41 53 60 48 68 
Analyses: 
Major bilateral donors 
Rank: 
1s< Ger Can Jap UK UK Jap UK Jap UK Jap UK Jap 
2" UK USA Can Jap Jap UK Jap Ger Ger UK USA USA 
3d Jap UK Ger Ger Fra Ger Ger Can Jap Fra Ger UK 
4" USA Jap UK Can Ger Can Can Neth Can Neth Can Neth 
Major multilateral donors 
Rank: 
1s' IDA IDA IDA IDA IDA IDA IDA IDA IDA IDA IDA IDA 
2* EDF EDF AfDF EDF AfDF ERF EDF ERF ERF EDF EDF EDF 
S" WFP WFP EDF WFP WFP EDF WFP EDF EDF AfDF AfDF AfDF 
4" Af.DF AfDF WFP AfDF EDF AfDF UNDP WFP WFPUNDP WFP WFP 
Source: Same as Table 1: OECD, Geographical distribution of financial flow to aid recipients, various issues. 
The United Kingdom also influences recipients in an informal manner to spend 
contracted aid on purchases from its source(s). Many factors contribute to the informal 
tying practice of the UK. These include the prevalence of traditional trade ties, which 
secures for the UK an advantage of not competing with alternative suppliers. Another 
factor is the influence that the UK has through colonial ties.7 In an attempt to appear 
flexible in its informal tying practice, the UK usually stipulates that the assistance can be 
used for expenditures outside of the UK markets only when the prices of UK suppliers 
are "unreasonably" high. The problem, however, is that the recipient is not given the 
option to compare UK prices with those of other markets. France uses indirect restrictions 
to tie some of its assistance. It treats the aid flow as part of an overall trade arrangement. 
This may take the form of restrictions that require the recipient to spend the aid funds on 
goods and services from France, while France reciprocally agrees to purchase some goods 
and services from the recipient on a preferential basis. 
In addition, most of the major donor governments tie some assistance through credit 
guarantees to importers and exporters from their countries. These credit guarantees most 
commonly include suppliers' credits, which are private export credits guaranteed partly 
or wholly by some institution in the donor country. The financial support of these 
institutions for such credits is directly or indirectly linked to an official policy of the 
donor government. The major export credit insurance organizations include the Export 
Credits Guarantee Department of the United Kingdom, the Banque Francais du Commerce 
Exterieur of France, Ausfuhrkredit and Kreiditanstalt fur Wiederaufhan of Germany, 
and the respective export-import banks of Japan and the United States. All these institutions 
have been responsible for substantial levels of aid to Ghana since the inception of the 
ERP. 
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3. The cost of aid-tying: 
An analysis of import prices 
This section estimates the cost of aid tying to Ghana by examining the distribution of prices of tied aid imports and non-aid imports from bilateral sources to Ghana.8 The fundamental issue of whether donors charge higher prices for aid imports is 
addressed in the study by comparing the prices of tied aid imports from bilateral sources 
with the prices of non-aid imports from these sources to Ghana. In the study, aid is 
official development assistance (ODA), which by definition includes concessionary loans 
and grants. Thus, tied aid imports cover commodity imports that are supplied by the 
donors on account of aid and bear restrictions on where Ghana could spend the aid funds 
and/or end-use restriction - through the specification of commodities and projects for 
which the assistance could be used.9 Non-aid imports are commodity imports paid for by 
Ghana. 
Methodological approach 
The first step in the empirical analysis is the compilation of annual data on quantity and value (f.o.b.) of tied aid imports and non-aid imports from bilateral sources to 
Ghana. The annual data on quantity and value of both tied aid imports and non-aid imports 
are obtained from the Ghana Statistical Service, which made the special effort to classify 
some of its data for the purposes of this study. The data are compiled on broad economic 
categories of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) at the five-digit 
level. The data are analysed in two-year averages in an attempt to smooth out the effects 
any unrepresentative trade values may have on the annual figures. 
The analysis is based on the computation of the unit value as a proxy for the price of 
imports.10 The unit value, U, of imports from a bilateral source i is calculated as the total 
value ( f . o. b.), V. over the quantity, Q. (UN, 1967; Yeats, 1990). The price margin (M.) 
for a bilateral source is determined as the ratio of the unit values between aid imports, a, 
and non-aid imports, g. That is: 
V IQ. 
M = , a V £ , a m 
V IQ. (1) •g 
An aggregate of the price margins across bilateral sources for each commodity group 
(M ) is derived as the weighted average of the individual price margins and the share of 
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each bilateral source in the total commodity group imports. These are then summed: 
M, iT 
a , V ^ia J K V, Ta (2) 
The measure for the total cost (or benefit) of the price differentials, E.r is derived as: 
EtT = l ( U i a - U i g ) x Q i a (3) 
where U.a and JJ are unit values for aid imports and non-aid imports of the various 
commodity groups, respectively. The sum of this difference is multiplied by the quantity 
of aid imports, Q.a to give how much more (or less) Ghana paid for aid imports for each 
commodity group. These calculations are then summed over all the commodity groups. 
Empirical estimates and interpretation 
The estimates of unit values, price margins and total costs (and benefits) for all commodities in the various SITC categories are presented in Table 4. The estimates 
suggest that Ghana has been paying more for tied aid imports than for non-aid imports. 
Over the 1990-1997 period as a whole, as well as for each of the two-year periods, it is 
apparent from Table 4 that the unit value of tied aid imports always exceeded that of 
non-aid imports for all commodities. The aggregates of the price margins show a price 
ratio of at least 3:1 between tied aid imports and non-aid imports for each of the two-year 
periods as well as the entire period. 
On the other hand, the unweighted price margins between tied aid imports and non-
aid imports show a price ratio of about 2:1.11 This would suggest that the bilateral donors 
that account for the largest shares in the total commodity imports to Ghana - that is, the 
major aid donors - are also the high cost sources. This indication is apparent from 
Appendix Table Al, which shows the empirical estimates of unit values, price margins 
and total costs for each bilateral source. The estimates indicate that the mark-up on aid 
imports cuts across many of the bilateral donors. Many of the major bilateral donors 
account for the highest premium in one commodity group or the other over the periods. 
Although no single country stands out as having the highest premium on its aid imports, 
the UK appears with the highest premium in most commodity groups in 1990/91 and 
1994/95. The same is the case for Norway in 1992/93 and 1996/97. Other countries with 
the highest price premiums include Switzerland during 1990/91 and France in 1992/93. 
How do our estimates compare with others? For one thing, as indicated earlier, there 
are rather very limited empirical studies of this kind. Jepma (1991, 1992) indicates that 
conservative empirical evidence suggests that tied aid prices are 10-15% higher than 
competitive world prices. A study by Yassin (1991), which focused on eight selected 
foreign-aided projects in Sudan, estimated that the price of tied commodities was 74% 
higher than alternative quotations from other sources. These estimate put the Ghanaian 
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case on the high side. However, attention must be drawn to difference in coverage, 
between, for example, the micro nature of Yassin's study and the macro approach adopted 
in this study. Moreover, given the conclusion of Yeats (1990) that African countries pay 
more for their imports,12 it is logical to expect that the price ratio we have obtained could 
be even higher. 
Table 4: Estimates of unit values, price margins and total costs (all commodities) 
1990-91 1992-93 
Unit value Unit value non- Price margin Price Total Unit value Unit value no Price margin 
aid imports aid imports (unweighted) margin cost ($) aid imports ($) aid imports (unweighted) 
Commodity group (UJ (UJ_ (M} (MJ' (EJ" (UJ (UJ_ (M/ 
SITC0 2.9251 2.3075 1.1277 0.9334 -815,269 2.3827 0.5810 4.8567 
S ITC1 - - - - - 3.7168 0.8087 3.3631 
SITC2 1.2917 0.4649 3.0084 3.6967 1,872489 1.1227 0.5959 1.8958 
SITC 3 3.3550 1.1974 2.0479 2.7353 214,870 3.2143 1.2145 0.7377 
SITC4 - - - - - 0.9607 1.3992 0.0221 
SITC 5 3.9398 0.9239 2.3539 4.7292 2,760,236 1.0689 0.0499 1.4027 
SITC 6 2.1760 0.8023 6.4217 7.2099 2,548,015 1.1553 1.2344 1.4992 
SITC 7 8.3729 4.1494 1.7168 2.2331 -10,387,552 9.3681 1.1417 1.6079 
SITC 8 1.0281 4.0554 1.9809 6.2810 68,248,827 6.9590 2.5115 2.5936 
All commodities 3.2983 1.9901 2.6653 3.9741* 64,441,616" 3.3276 1.998 1.9976 
1994-97 1996-97 
Unit value Unit value Price margin Price Total Unit value Unit value non- Price margin 
aid imports aid imports (unweighted) margin cost ($) aid imports ($) aid imports($) (unweighted) 
Commodity group (UJ W m (MJ' (En)" (UJ W (Mi) 
SITC 0 6.0717 0.6263 4.0345 6.2021 93,967 6.9440 0.5923 4.4922 
SITC 1 0.6778 0.9344 0.4640 0.7873 -3,541 0.7952 0.9273 4.6314 
SITC 2 0.7882 0.6447 0.8027 1.2102 -1,028 2.5412 0.6968 0.4214 
SITC 3 0.5878 0.5708 1.1006 1.2987 -60,827 2.1338 0.9107 2.1828 
SITC 4 1.2039 2.7321 0.7273 0.2148 -52,893 2.0159 1.2103 3.7621 
SITC 5 1.5927 0.4289 2.1732 3.7149 776,763 1.2154 1.4631 2.1868 
SITC 6 2.5366 0.1530 4.3216 6.2128 6,578,621 2.7669 0.1495 2.2112 
SITC 7 10.0362 1.1196 4.2675 6.0080 29,108,284 13.9535 2.3938 3.1625 
SITC 8 14.0923 4.7174 1.6656 3.5507 3,878,606 10.9245 5.5032 1.1170 
All commodities 4.1764 1.3252 2.1730 3.2444* 40,317,952** 4.8101 1.538 2.6853 
1990-97 
Unit value Unit value Price margin Price Total 
aid imports non-aid imports (unweighted) margin cost($) 
lity group (UJ (UJ w (MJ (EJ 
SITC 0 4.5808 1.0269 3.6277 5.6638 325,914 
SITC 1 1.7299 0.8901 2.8195 5.5505 -1,625 
SITC 2 1.8684 06005 1.5321 1.7365 503,187 
SITC 3 2.3227 0.9733 1.5172 1.5852 530,271 
SITC 4 1.3935 1.7805 1.5038 1.6713 17,922 
SITC 5 1.9542 0.7164 2.0291 3.4506 -594,290 
SITC 6 2.1589 0.5848 3.6134 4.5795 1,258,944 
The estimated price differentials between tied aid imports and non-aid imports translate 
into a total cost of at least $350 million, that is, an average cost of at least $40 million per 
year over the 1990-1997 period (see Table 4). It is important to qualify this estimated 
cost. Since tied aid imports include grant-financed imports, it is to be expected that the 
actual cost to Ghana could be reduced. Nevertheless, the significance of the estimated 
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costs is seen in context. Over the 1990-1997 period, aid imports to Ghana averaged 
about $80 million per annum. Thus, the estimated annual cost of aid tying of about $40 
million is nearly half the annual average cost of aid imports to Ghana. In other words, the 
level of aid imports could have been one-and-a-half times the level actually experienced 
if the prices of aid imports had reflected those of non-aid imports. It is thus apparent that 
the price differentials imply a significant loss of essential imports to Ghana. 
Moreover, the estimates in Table 4 indicate that the bulk of the total cost and. by 
implication, the bulk of the loss of imports are associated with commodities in the S1TC 
categories 6-8. These categories represent the high technology, more sophisticated and 
dynamic products in international trade; higher levels of such imports are crucial for the 
long-term development of Ghana. In other words, the loss of such imports delays the 
long-term development of the country. Furthermore, the estimated cost of tying per annum 
represents about 10% of the total annual inflows from bilateral sources to Ghana (see 
Table 3). In other words, bilateral donors to Ghana recoup about a tenth of their total 
inflows through higher charges on aid imports. In effect, debt repayments on bilateral 
aid have an element of a subsidy from Ghana to the donor countries. 
What explains the observed price differentials? It is quite obvious that conditions in 
both Ghana and the donor countries are responsible. With regard to Ghana, it is arguable 
that since it is a poor country it might have purchased lower-priced, poorer-quality goods, 
given that product and quality differentiation do exist among commodities in the same 
SITC category. Although any inference on quality differences between aid and non-aid 
imports is difficult to make, an examination of available data on the commodity 
composition of imports (see Appendix Table A2) shows no significant differences between 
the types of aid and non-aid imports. In other words it may be reasonable to reject any 
argument that Ghana buys different types of commodities from those supplied by aid 
donors. 
On the other hand, the investment climate in Ghana may be a factor behind the observed 
price differentials. Over the study period there was a sharp rise in the level of aid imports 
that were directly financed by exporters in the donor countries.13 When exporters in 
donor countries finance exports of capital goods to developing countries, the export 
prices (f.o.b) may reflect the risk of investment in the recipient country. Although the 
investment climate in Ghana has undergone changes since 1983 to reduce the risks of 
investments, some concerns still remain that could serve as incentives for export financiers 
to mark-up export prices. The World Bank (1993), for example, cites the continuance of 
a cobweb of old controls and regulations, and the lack of transparency in the enforcement 
of laws and regulations as factors that still cloud the investment climate and increase the 
risks of investment in Ghana. 
In the donor countries it is easy to point at factors in the market for aid goods as 
contributing to the higher prices of those exports. In each of the donor countries there 
could be many exporting firms for commodities financed by aid. Therefore, the potential 
for collusive practices and overpricing must, normally, be expected to be minimal. 
However, the estimates of higher prices on aid imports suggest that contracts for the 
supply of such imports are not won on the basis of competitive procedures. The supply 
of aid imports may be concentrated in a small number of firms in the donor countries, 
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thereby leading to oligopolistic pricing practices. Or the supply of aid imports entails no 
competition at all, that is, the so-called "direct negotiation". Either way, the results obtained 
in this study suggest that the basic .subsidy involved in aid from the bilateral sources is 
being captured by private exporters in the donor countries rather than Ghana for whom it 
is intended. This would suggest that existing donor actions such as antitrust legislation, 
and other government agencies officially charged with the protection of consumer interests 
and the maintenance of competition in the domestic markets of the bilateral donors, are 
having little restraining effects on the export market covered by foreign aid. 
4. Conclusion 
This study set out to investigate the prices of tied aid imports to Ghana. The study finds that there is a significant mark-up on the prices of tied aid imports in relation to the prices of non-aid imports. The price differentials translate into a substantial 
cost to Ghana. It is suggested that domestic factors in Ghana and conditions in the market 
for the export of aid commodities in the donor countries lay behind the observed price 
differentials and the associated costs. 
As Ghana continues to make increasing use of export credits, it is essential that steps 
be taken to improve the investment climate in the country. This will reduce the risk of 
investment in the country, which in turn, will enhance the confidence of export financiers 
to reduce the incentive for marking up export prices to reflect the higher risk of investment 
in the country. There is also need for action on the part of bilateral aid donors to liberalize 
the market for the supply of aid exports in their countries. 
Finally, the higher cost of aid imports may be a necessary price Ghana has to pay to 
receive aid since, arguably, higher cost aid may be better than no aid. At the same time, 
evidence of higher prices and associated costs on aid imports to Ghana provides a case 
for the cancellation of the country's aid debt to the bilateral donors. 
Notes 
1. The history of economic thought on foreign aid is somewhat peculiar. The 
phenomenal success of the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s and early 1950s led to 
the belief that similar transfers to developing countries would enable their 
comparably spectacular transformation. That belief had two intellectual 
underpinnings (Krueger, 1986). The first was the Harrod-Domar model that 
extended the Keynesian emphasis on investment to include its capacity-increasing 
effects. The second was economists' emphasis on physical capital, and the view 
that shortage of capital largely accounted for the poverty of developing countries. 
The critical bottleneck to growth was believed to be the shortage of investment, 
which in most developing countries was low because of low saving rate. Foreign 
aid could thus play a dual role in the development process: as a supplement to 
domestic savings on one hand, and on the other hand as a supplement to foreign 
exchange. 
2. For a long time the debate on aid effectiveness has been conducted between 
committed but critical advocates of aid, and those who have been profoundly 
convinced, for one reason or another, that aid is not a "good thing". These include 
those who argue that aid either perpetuates dependency and perverts domestic 
investment (see, e.g., Hayter, 1971) or that it permits governments to "escape the 
burdens of their foolish economic policies" (Krauss, 1983). The aid donors and 
recipients themselves have, by and large, stayed on the sidelines of this debate. 
They are fairly sure that most of what they do is well done (OECD, 1985). For 
them, and even more striking in the thinking of earlier major international reviews 
such as Pearson (1964) and, more recently, Cassen and Associates (1986), the 
case for aid is self-evident. 
3. The current account deficit on the balance of payments increased steadily from 
about 2% of GDP in 1983 to about 5% during 1985-1988. It rose to about 8% in 
1990, and had risen to about 10% by 1993 (see, Bank of Ghana, Quarterly Digest 
of Statistics, various issues). The widening current account deficit in the last decade 
is explained in part by deterioration in the country's terms of trade. Although the 
country's export volumes have increased substantially, export values have 
stagnated. For example, the export volume index (1980 = 100) increased steadily 
from 84 in 1983 to 176 in 1990. Export values, however, increased by a much 
smaller proportion: from 66 to 83 over the same period (Osei, 1995). The less than 
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proportionate increase in export values is due to the decline in the real prices of 
the country's main commodity exports, cocoa and gold. For example, the index 
(1980 = 100) of the real cocoa price declined continuously from 113 in 1984 to 35 
in 1990. Similarly, the index for gold fell from 63 to 48 over the same period. 
4. A number of authors have attempted to provide reasons for the interest donors 
have shown in Ghana since the inception of the ERP. Martin (1991) and Aryeetey 
(1995) share the view that the significant growth in aid after 1983 is attributed to 
the improved adjustment record after the initial reforms. Aryeetey adds that 
improvement in the Government of Ghana's ability to negotiate for aid is also a 
contributory reason for the higher levels of inflows. Younger (1992), on the other 
hand, has suggested that many donors supported the ERP because of the bandwagon 
effect it created, as all donors wished to be associated with "a potentially good 
case". 
5. Such commercial pressures on aid are, of course, not new. In recent times, however, 
the economic situation in the donor countries, and the perception that aid is under 
pressure, have led many to the view that aid budgets can be defended by 
demonstrating immediate returns to the donor in terms of jobs and exports.The 
view that tying helps to defend aid budgets, or indeed that it should be used to 
support exports and jobs in the donor country, may not hold up to scrutiny for a 
number of reasons. First, it fits uncomfortably with many of the broad orientations 
that now guide relations between donors and recipients - market based reform 
programmes including liberalization, competition and deregulation. Second, the 
view in support of tying represents a basic distortion of the real issues, options and 
implications involved in the contemporary challenge of development. For example, 
while the "benefits" to a donor's enterprises from tying aid to domestic procurement 
may well be tangible and "up front", these are dwarfed by the longer-term benefits 
that arise from the development of future export markets in recipient countries 
through more liberal policies. Aid budgets can be justified (rather than defended) 
in donor countries not only because of the more enduring returns from future 
export markets but also because they are contributing to sound and sustainable 
development - and this will be recognized not only by those concerned with aid 
accountability, but equally by the public at large. 
6. In theory, the primary cause of aid tying is balance of payments difficulty (in the 
case of donors with deficits) and balance of payments protection (where the donor 
has a surplus). (See, for example, Bhagwati, 1967; Lynn, 1970.) Aid tying is 
considered to reduce for the donor the loss of real income that would otherwise 
follow if aid transfer did not give rise to matching demand for exports. In other 
words, aid tying will ensure aid expenditure by recipient countries in the donor 
country and prevent a leakage into alternative sources of exports, both of which 
will help the balance of payments position in the donor country. A similar motivation 
of reducing the real cost of making a certain financial transfer of resources may 
also underlie a desire for tying aid to industries in the donor country where there is 
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excess capacity or already surplus stocks. 
The tendency to tie aid may also result from a combination of other factors -
economic and political. Some donors may tie aid to specific projects because, 
according to their experiences, this will probably lead to the most efficient use of 
resources. Other donors might also feel that by financing conspicuous projects 
that are easily identifiable in the public mind, they would secure political credibility 
for their aid programmes both at home and in the recipient country. 
7. Some authors have shown that external aid cooperation based on colonial ties is 
very important in some developing countries. Kleiman (1976), for example, shows 
that the United Kingdom's aid cooperation with former colonies is about three 
times the level with other developing countries; for France this level is about eight 
times, and the level is even higher in the case of Belgian, Italian and Portuguese 
colonies. Consequently, aid tying resulting from colonial leverage is also more 
prevalent. Yeats (1990), for example, reports that over the period 1962-1987, 
twenty former French colonies in Africa paid a price premium on average 20-
30% higher than the price other importers paid for iron and steel from France. The 
losses to the African countries associated with the aid tying totalled about $2 billion. 
Similarly, former Belgian, British and Portuguese colonies in Africa paid price 
premiums of 20-30% higher for imports from their former rulers than other 
importers paid. 
8. It is necessary to point out that the cost of aid tying may be evaluated from several 
other angles, including, for example, examining the concessionality of the aid 
flow and treating the cost of aid as a reduction in the real value of the assistance. 
9. Since grants may involve no repayments, but without suggesting that grants involve 
no cost to the recipient country, it may be ideal not to include grant-financed 
imports in the analysis of cost. However, such a disaggregation is not possible 
because of data constraints. 
10. An analysis based on the unit value as a proxy for the actual price may be limited 
by the fact that differences among products grouped in the same SITC category, 
or differences in quality, may be reflected as price differences. In a sense, such 
limitations impose a sense of modesty on any results obtained. 
11. At the same time, inferring from Morrissey and White (1996) that based on the 
OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) norm of a grant element of 
86%, tying would have to increase prices by over 600% if the excess prices were 
to offset the grant element, it may be safe to assume that aid to Ghana from the 
bilateral sources still incorporated some element of concession. 
12. Yeats (1990) estimates a price premium of 20-30% on the imports of only iron 
and steel products of some African countries from France. The losses to these 
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countries over the 1962-1987 period totalled approximately $2 billion. 
Imports that were covered by export credits rose from an annual average of $34 
million in 1985-1990 to over $80 million in 1990-1995. 
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Appendix: Supplementary tables o o CO 
Table A1: Est imates of un i t va lues , pr ice marg ins and cos t s ( c o m m o d i t y g r o u p s and bi lateral sou rces ) 
Ua 
1990-91 
Ug MiT EiT Ua 
1992-93 
ug MiT EiT Ua 
SITC 0 2.9252 2.3076 0.9334 -815269.85 SITC 0 2.3827 0.5817 7.8773 1930720.52 s r r c o 6.0717 
Italy 12.9811 16.7841 0.5988 -1205561.66 United States 3.1202 0.5823 0.4844 172844.75 United Kingdom* 6.5208 
United Kingdom 0.8000 0.5398 0.3346 390291.81 United Kingdom 3.1872 0.4943 0.1860 57297.18 United States 0.9727 
Netherlands 4.6136 0.7101 0.0196 6010.56 
Italy 1.2087 0.8202 0.0578 29637.22 
Belgium 0.3252 0.5095 0.0150 -31325.55 






SITC 1 3.7169 0.8087 6.2437 3440.37 SITC 1 0.6779 
United Kingdom* 27.2667 0.7422 3.1708 397.87 Netherlands 0.6785 
Netherlands 3.4365 1.0218 3.0729 3042.51 United Kingdom* 0.1364 
SITC 2 1.2917 0.4649 3.6967 1872489.18 SITC 2 1.1226 0.5959 1.2478 150546.19 SITC 2 0.7883 
Australia 1.5188 2.0284 0.0062 -8154.48 United States 0.7732 0.4790 0.0021 604.73 Germany* 1.4583 
United Kingdom* 4.8289 0.7512 2.3991 929734.81 United Kingdom 1.1960 1.0117 1.1226 180594.64 Italy 0.2365 
United States 0.8946 0.4285 1.2915 950908.85 Netherlands 0.2116 0.7542 0.0048 -54266.79 United States 0.3949 
Italy 1.6435 0.8339 0.0030 930.97 
Germany* 3.3753 0.8336 0.1141 26179.72 
France 2.5313 0.6757 0.0002 59.38 
Australia 0.4476 1.0471 0.0009 -3555.46 
SITC 3 3.3551 1.1975 2.7354 214870.75 SITC 3 3.2144 0.2145 93.1487 -34047.52 SITC 3 0.5879 
Australia 3.6458 2.8421 0.0651 3857.83 United States 10.3255 0.1615 5.6615 20013.04 Belgium 0.3427 
United Kingdom* 3.3408 1.1876 2.6703 211012.92 United Kingdom 5.0564 0.4281 4.9599 88262.20 United Kingdom* 1.0895 
Australia 0.9556 8.3077 0.0013 -19520.01 
Belgium 0.0940 1.3127 0.0001 -5850.07 
Canada 0.5171 3.3834 0.0117 -97454.36 
France* 29.7500 0.2150 0.7172 1181.40 
continued 
Table A1: continued 
Ua 
1990-91 
Ug MiT EiT 
SITC 5 3.9399 0.9239 4.7292 2760236.58 SITC 
Ua 
1992-93 







































SITC 1.0689 0.4985 1.5483 -4557743.45 SITC 5 1.5928 






Dyeing, tanning and colouring material 
Medical and pharmaceutical products 
Essential oils, perfume materials; toilet cleaning preparations 
Fertilizers 
Plastics in primary forms 
Plastic in non-primary forms 
Chemical materials and products 
Aid imports 
SITC 5 
Beauty, make-up, skin care 
Personal deodorants and anti-perspirants 
Radioactive elements/isotopes and their compounds 
SITC 6 
Leather, leather manufactures and dressed furskins 
Rubber manufactures 
Cork and wood manufactures (excl. furniture) 
Paper, paperboard, and articles of paper pulp, paper or paperboard 
Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles and related products 
Non-metallic mineral manufactures 
Iron and steel 
Non-ferrous metals 
Manufactures of metals 
SITC 6 
Handkerchiefs, cleansing tissues, towels, etc. 
Other articles of paper pulp, paper, paperboard, cellulose wadding 
continued 
Table A2: continued 
1995 
Non-aid imports Aid imports 
SITC 7 SITC 7 
Power generation machinery and equipment 
Machinery specialized for particular industries 
Metal working machinery 
Compression-ignition engines (diesel or semi-diesel engines) 
Motor vehicles for the transport of persons 
Motor vehicles for the transport of goods 
General industrial machinery and equipment, machine parts 
Office machines and automatic data processing machines 
Telecommunications and sound recording/reproducing apparatus 
Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances 
Road vehicles (including air-cushion vehicles) 
Other transport equipment 
SITC 8 SITC 8 
Prefabricated buildings; sanitary, plumbing, etc. fixing and fittings Books, brochures and similar printed matter, not in single sheets 
Furniture and parts thereof; bedding, mattresses, etc. Footwear with outer soles and uppers of rubber or plastics 
Travel goods, handbags and similar containers 
Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 
Footwear 
Professional, scientific and controlling instruments and apparatus 
Photographic apparatus, equipment and supplies and optical goods; watches j j 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles «j 
m > 3 
Sourec: Ghana Statistical Service. i 
•u 
> "0 m 3 
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